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Abstract 
While a perpetrator may engage in an information security breach with a negative 
(e.g., to release anger and frustration) or positive (e.g., to improve security) intent, it 
is unclear whether intent has an impact on individuals’ assessment of the 
perpetrator’s responsibility. This study provides insight into this issue. Additionally, 
we examine whether moral affect explains the impact of perceived intensity of 
emotional distress on responsibility judgment (mediating hypothesis) and whether 
consideration of outcome strengthens the impact of moral affect on responsibility 
judgment (moderating hypothesis). We analyze the usable responses of 187 
participants and the results provide support for the hypotheses, except for the 
mediating hypothesis for the positive intent act. Lack of mediating effect in the 
positive intent act suggests that the nature of the act might diminish the effect of 
moral affect on responsibility judgment. The findings highlight the significant role of 
consideration of the outcome in the relationship between moral affect and 
responsibility judgment regardless of the nature of intent. 
Keywords:  Information security breach, moral affect; moral intensity; consideration of the 
outcome; responsibility judgment 
 
Introduction 
Perpetrators exposed the personal data of 500 million customers of Marriott in an information security 
breach (Brewster, 2018). This incident was not the first time that perpetrators breached Marriott’s 
system. The hotel chain suffered at least one unreported incident, including an infection that hit the 
company’s own cyber-incident response team (Brewster, 2018). Marriott’s data breach was one of the 
biggest on record which led several government agencies to take action to revise regulation to punish 
entities that lose or misuse individuals’ private information (Brewster, 2018). This action increases 
pressure for entities to provide increased protection for personal data.  
Individuals consider the extent of morality of an act when they assess responsibility (Jones, 1991). A 
perpetrator’s intent (Barclay, Whiteside, and Aquino, 2014), perceived intensity of the harmful 
consequences (Jones, 1991), and the outcome of an act (Braham and van Hees, 2012) can influence 
responsibility judgment. Perceived intensity of harmful consequences plays a significant role in how 
individuals respond to an act which needs to reach a certain threshold before they perceive the act as 
immoral and assess responsibility accordingly (Jones, 1991). An information security breach causes 
victims to experience emotional distress (e.g., concerns about misuse of personal data) regardless of a 
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perpetrator’s intent (e.g., enhance security, improve technology, protect privacy, obtain monetary 
gains, or release anger and frustration) (Chiesa, Ducci, and Ciappi, 2009). To our knowledge, limited 
research is available for promoting understanding of whether a perpetrator’s intent influences 
responsibility judgment, especially in the case of a positive intent act. While some studies suggest that 
engagement in a positive intent act may elicit emotional responses which cause individuals to  
empathize with and condone the perpetrator (Cushman, 2014; DeScioli and Kurzban, 2013; 
Hannikainen, Miller, and Cushman, 2013), other studies indicate that the harmful consequences as a 
result of the perpetrator’s act cannot be overlooked despite the positive intent; therefore, the act may 
be perceived as unacceptable (Crockett et al., 2010; Decety, Michalska, and Akitsuki, 2008; Young 
and Saxe, 2011). We examine two information security incidents, one with a negative and the other 
with a positive intent to enhance understanding of individuals’ reaction toward an information 
security breach. Increased understanding of the implications of intent on users’ responsibility 
judgment may assist the regulatory authorities to institute legislation which imposes severe penalties 
on the perpetrators to deter information security breach. 
Responsibility judgment requires consideration of both the victims and the perpetrator (Gray, Waytz, 
and Young, 2012). Individuals consider the victims when they think about the harmful consequences 
(e.g., emotional distress) in their responsibility judgment. Increased consideration of the victims’ 
emotional distress increases the saliency of the victims’ emotional distress and motivates individuals 
to restore equity for the victims (Crockett et al., 2010). Further, individuals may believe that a 
perpetrator should feel bad (i.e., moral affect) when he or she realizes that the act causes harmful 
consequences to the victims (Tangney, 1991). Hence, individuals may hold the perpetrator responsible 
for the act to restore equity for the victims (Green, Burnette, and Davis, 2008). To our knowledge, 
limited research is available for promoting understanding of whether a negative or positive intent 
induces different levels of moral affect (i.e., perception of a perpetrator’s feelings of regret, sorry, 
guilt, and shame) which explains the effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on 
responsibility judgment. Additionally, research is sparse on whether a negative or positive intent act 
affects the moderating role of consideration of the outcome in the relationship between moral affect 
and responsibility judgment. The purpose of this study is to examine whether (1) moral affect explains 
the effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on responsibility judgment (mediating 
hypothesis) and (2) whether consideration of the outcome strengthens the impact of moral affect on 
responsibility judgment (moderating hypothesis) for a negative or positive intent act.  
Participants completed a questionnaire containing items measuring their perceived intensity of the 
victims’ emotional distress, perceived moral affect, consideration of the outcome, and responsibility 
judgment. Analyses of the usable responses of 187 participants provide support for the mediating and 
moderating hypotheses for the negative intent act. The mediating hypothesis is not supported while 
the moderating hypothesis is supported for the positive intent act. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature 
and develops the hypotheses, followed by the research method and results. Finally, the findings of this 
study, its limitations and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
Background Literature 
Moral Intensity 
Moral intensity theory asserts that each act encompasses a different degree of moral intensity that has 
to reach a certain threshold before one is able to recognize an act as a moral issue and become aware 
of the need for a moral response (Jones, 1991). Moral intensity theory proposes that the following six 
components: magnitude of consequences, probability of consequences, temporal immediacy, 
proximity, concentration of effect, and social consensus determine the extent of perceived intensity 
(Jones, 1991). Previous research (e.g., Jordan, Diermeier, and Galinsky, 2012; McMahon and Harvey, 
2007; Robertson, Lamin, and Livanis, 2010) suggests that not all of these components need to be 
present for the formation of moral intensity. We focus on magnitude of consequences, probability of 
consequences, and temporal immediacy based on the relevance of these components to the 
information security incidents examined in this study. 
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Magnitude of consequences refers to perceived severity of harmful consequences. Moral intensity is 
high when one believes that the victims have suffered severe harmful consequences. Probability of 
consequences pertains to the perceived likelihood that the victims might actually experience the 
harmful consequences. High moral intensity occurs when one feels that the victims are likely to suffer 
harmful consequences as a result of an act. Temporal immediacy refers to the perceived time distance 
between the occurrence of an act and harmful consequences. High moral intensity is present when one 
believes that the victims are likely to suffer the consequences immediately (Jones, 1991). When 
perceived intensity of the harmful consequences is high, awareness of the harmful consequences and 
concern about the victims’ well-being may result in increased concern for righteousness and a need 
for engaging in a moral act to restore equity for the victims (Green, Burnette, and Davis, 2008).  
Moral Affect 
Innate moral beliefs promote harmonious interpersonal and social relationships among individuals and 
reduce propensity toward harmful acts (Bandura et al., 2001). Although individuals are unlikely to 
pursue an act that causes harmful consequences to others, they may erroneously conclude that moral 
beliefs are irrelevant and may engage in an act that causes harmful consequences to others in certain 
situations (Bersoff, 1999). Once individuals realize that their act causes harmful consequences to 
others, they might acknowledge that the act indeed violates their moral beliefs. This 
acknowledgement leads to activation of moral affect; that is, the perpetrators’ feelings [i.e., regret, 
sorry, guilt, and shame (Tangney, 1991)] after they realize that their acts violate morality (Gray and 
Schein, 2012; Haidt, 2003). 
Moral affect occurs when a perpetrator takes the perspective of the victims and realizes that the act 
causes harmful consequences to the victims (Tangney, 1991). One may take the perspective of the 
victims, realize the harmful consequences to the victims, and form an opinion about the perpetrator’s 
feelings about an act that violates morality (de Hooge et al., 2011). An observer’s perception of the 
perpetrator’s feelings may be consistent with the actual feelings of the perpetrator. The only 
difference is that the observers can notice and attend to information that the perpetrator might 
overlook (Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman, 2006) because observers do not have to protect their 
personal interests. Thus, one’s perception of the perpetrator’s moral affect can be considered to be 
reliable (Savitsky et al., 2005). 
Responsibility Judgment 
The discussion on responsibility in the fields of philosophy, justice, ethics, and social regulation 
shares a common theme of accountability; that is, the need for individuals to explain and justify their 
act to others (Tetlock, 1992). Responsibility serves as a mechanism which allows individuals to 
evaluate, sanction, and control one another’s behavior to promote harmony among members of 
society. When a perpetrator engages in an act that does not conform to the morality of society or 
impairs harmony among members, individuals may hold the perpetrator responsible for the act 
(Fischer, 1997). 
Perceived consequences is an important factor for assessing a perpetrator’s responsibility for the act 
(Hutcherson and Gross, 2011). The same act that violates morality can produce different perceptions 
of consequences (Schlenker et al., 1994). For example, telling lies is wrong because it violates 
society’s moral values. However, some lies may produce serious consequences (e.g., cause injury to a 
victim), while some lies may be perceived as innocuous (e.g., compliment a colleague on her new 
dress when it seems to be out of fashion). A person telling a lie that causes serious consequences is 
held responsible to a greater extent than an individual telling a lie that causes less harmful 
consequences. Differences in responsibility judgment are a result of affect triggered during evaluation 
of the consequences of an act (Greene et al., 2009; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010). Intense consequences 
activate strong affect which in turn motivates individuals to attach increased responsibility to the 
perpetrator (Gray and Wegner, 2009; Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek, 2007). 
Consideration of the Outcome 
A moral situation involves a perpetrator and the victims (Gray, Waytz, and Young, 2012). A 
perpetrator is associated with an act while the victims are associated with the negative outcome they 
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experience as a result of the act (Gray and Schein, 2012). Individuals consider both the perpetrator 
and victims to obtain an understanding of the situation before they form a conclusion on the morality 
of an act (Gray and Wegner, 2009; Weber and McGivern, 2010). Consideration of a negative outcome 
leads to recognition of the victims’ pain and loss; this phenomenon is particularly acute when 
individuals take the perspective of the victims (Singer and Lamm, 2009), leading to increased 
possibility of moral condemnation and evaluation of the act as morally wrong (Crockett et al., 2010). 
Individuals may also consider a perpetrator’s feelings about an act when they assess responsibility. 
This consideration may activate negative emotional responses on how bad individuals may feel about 
the act (Hannikainen et al., 2013). Violation of morality can be emphasized to direct attention to the 
belief that an act is wrong (Miller, Hannikainen, and Cushman, 2014). Although some acts entail a 
negative outcome, lack of intent to harm the victims may result in increased empathy and 
consideration of an act in a positive light; therefore, the act may be perceived as less morally wrong 
(Cushman, 2014; Masek, 2000). 
Hypotheses 
The Mediating Role of Moral Affect 
Information security incidents induce different degrees of magnitude of consequences, probability of 
consequences, and temporal immediacy. Some incidents might result in increased perceived intensity 
of emotional distress to the victims, while others might elicit less intense reactions (Jones, 1991). 
Harmful consequences can elicit strong emotional response when the victims are perceived to suffer 
high intensity of emotional distress as a result of an incident (Gautshi and Jones, 1998; Van Boven et 
al., 2010). Individuals may believe that the perpetrator should feel bad for engaging in an act that 
causes high intensity of emotional distress to the victims (Tangney and Dearing, 2002); hence, the act 
is perceived to violate morality and increased responsibility is assessed against the perpetrator 
(Schlenker et al., 1994). Perceived intensity of emotional distress can also influence responsibility 
judgment; specifically, individuals assign increased responsibility to a perpetrator when an act is 
perceived to cause high intensity of emotional distress (Coram et al., 2008; Valentine and 
Hollingworth, 2012). 
An information security breach may be initiated with either a negative or positive intent (Chiesa et al., 
2002; Thomas, 2002). In the case of a negative intent act, individuals may take action to restore 
justice and fairness when the perpetrator is perceived to cause emotional distress to the victims 
(Barclay, Whiteside, and Aquino, 2014). An information security breach with a negative intent entails 
widespread consequences including emotional distress for the targeted victims and innocent others 
(Galbreth and Shor, 2010). Thus, perceived intensity of emotional distress is expected to increase 
responsibility judgment against the perpetrator. Further, perceived intensity of emotional distress may 
result in the perception that a perpetrator should regret and be sorry, guilty, and ashamed for engaging 
in an act that causes emotional distress to the victims. Hence, individuals may be motivated to restore 
equity and fairness to the victims and hold the perpetrator responsible for violation of morality 
(Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek, 2007). The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Moral affect mediates the effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on responsibility 
judgment for a negative intent act. 
When an information security breach involves a positive intent, the unintentional harmful 
consequences may be perceived as unavoidable for the attainment of a greater good (Cushman, 2014). 
However, an act that causes emotional distress to the victims may be viewed negatively, regardless of 
the perpetrator’s intent (Young and Saxe, 2011). Since individuals might not overlook the fact that the 
perpetrator engages in an act that results in the victims’ emotional distress, they may hold the 
perpetrator responsible for the act (Monroe and Reeder, 2011). Individuals may also conclude that the 
perpetrator should regret and be sorry, guilty, and ashamed for the act which causes emotional distress 
to the victims despite the positive intent (Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Consistent with the arguments 
put forth in hypothesis 1a, the need for restoring the violation of morality and easing the victims’ pain 
may result in increased responsibility judgment against the perpetrator. Therefore,  
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H1b: Moral affect mediates the effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on responsibility 
judgment for a positive intent act. 
The Moderating Role of Consideration of the Outcome 
Individuals tend to view a negative intent act in a negative light when they assess responsibility 
(Hamlin, 2013). Increased consideration of the victims’ emotional distress (Gautshi and Jones, 1998) 
due to the harmful consequences of the negative intent act may arouse a strong negative emotional 
response (Bucciarelli, Khemlani, and Johnson-Laird, 2008) which results in increased responsibility 
judgment. The next hypothesis investigates this issue: 
H2a: Consideration of the outcome moderates the effect of moral affect on responsibility judgment for 
a negative intent act. 
When evaluating responsibility for a positive intent act, individuals may realize that a perpetrator does 
not have the intention to cause emotional distress to the victims. However, they may not rule out the 
fact that the victims suffered emotional distress as a result of the act. When individuals consider the 
outcome of an incident, they may conclude that the perpetrator can choose not to engage in the act 
which causes the harmful consequences to others (Monroe and Reeder, 2011). Thus, individuals may 
view the act in a negative light regardless of the positive intent (Decety, 2011). Specifically, negative 
reaction toward the act may increase when the outcome of the act is considered regardless of the 
positive intent (Singer and Lamm, 2009), leading to motivation to obtain justice for the victims. 
Finally, 
H2b: Consideration of the outcome moderates the effect of moral affect on responsibility judgment 
for a positive intent act. 
Method 
Development of Research Instrument 
Two hypothetical scenarios describing two different information security incidents in a business 
context were developed based on court documents available on the U.S. Department of Justice 
website, and reports published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Computer Security Institute, and the 
media. One scenario depicted an incident with a negative intent while the other scenario described an 
incident with a positive intent. The materials revealed that taking revenge on corporations, stealing 
confidential information for financial purposes, and destroying corporate systems were widely known 
examples of incidents with a negative intent in corporate system intrusions. Since revenge occur 
frequently in intrusion reports, it is selected to represent negative intent in this study. 
Corporate systems may also be intruded with the intention to help improve information security. This 
study uses helping behavior (i.e., testing security measures to detect vulnerabilities) to represent 
positive intent. The information provided in the scenarios is adapted from actual computer incidents 
from the court documents. 
Pretest 
First, we conducted a verbal protocol with the pretest participants. They were asked to think out loud 
their thoughts while they read the instrument. We revised the research instrument based on the 
feedback received from the verbal protocol procedure. We then pretested the research instrument with 
28 senior accounting students. The instrument was further revised based on the feedback received 
from the pretest participants.  
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Task 
Participants read two hypothetical scenarios1, answered questions pertaining to the scenarios2, and 
provided demographic information. Each participant received a t-shirt for completing the research 
instrument. 
Participants 
The usable responses of 187 participants were analyzed. Participants were students, employees, and 
visitors recruited from a university in the U.S. Their age ranged between 19 and 64 and the mean was 
30. About 46% were males, and 84% had professional work experience ranging from one to 42 years 
and the mean was 8.7 years. Approximately 10% worked in the technology industry, 85% worked in 
the non-technology-related industry, and 5% did not disclose the nature of their work. The 
participants’ demographic information (i.e., age, gender, work experience, and computer incident 
experience) did not have an impact on the dependent variable, responsibility judgment. 
Measurement of Variables 
Perceived Intensity of Emotional Distress 
The perceived intensity of emotional distress construct is adapted from moral intensity theory (Jones, 
1991; Singhapakdi, Vitell, and Kraft, 1996). Perceived intensity of emotional distress is measured via 
a three-item scale. Participants responded (on a 7-point scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = 
strongly agree) to questions assessing their perceptions of the magnitude (the victims would suffer 
serious emotional distress), probability (the victims would definitely suffer emotional distress), and 
temporal immediacy (the victims would immediately suffer emotional distress) of the consequences in 
the positive and negative intent scenarios. 
Moral Affect 
The literature on moral affect (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2011; Ghorbani et al., 2013; Tangney et al., 1996) 
suggests that emotions such as regret, sorry, guilt, and shame are activated when individuals 
encounter an act that causes harmful consequences to the victims. Thus, we assess moral affect via a 
four-item scale; that is, perceptions of whether the perpetrator should regret and be sorry, guilty, and 
ashamed of the act (on a 7-point scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). 
Responsibility Judgment 
Responsibility judgment of the perpetrator’s responsibility for the information security breach is 
measured on a 7-point scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
Consideration of the Outcome 
The extent of the participants’ consideration of the outcome in responsibility judgment is measured on 
a 7-point scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
Results 
Psychometric Properties of Measurement 
We use the varimax rotation in Mplus to test the measurement model to assess the psychometric 
properties of two latent variables, intensity of emotional distress and moral affect. The factor loadings 
of perceived intensity of emotional distress and moral affect are acceptable for the negative and 
positive intent acts (Table 1). 
                                                     
1 The order of the scenarios was not randomized. Participants were less vulnerable to order effect 
because they relied on their personal moral beliefs, rather than external factors such as information 
from other cases, when they evaluated cases involving moral issues (Wright, 2010). In addition, the 
pretest results indicated that the order of the scenarios did not have an effect on their responses. 
2 The order of the questions was randomized. 
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Table 1. Loadings, Cross-Loadings, and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of Latent 
Constructs 
Panel A: Negative Intent 
 
Perceived Intensity of 
Emotional Distress 
Moral Affect AVE 
Magnitude of consequences .660 .131 
0.500 Probability of consequences .783 .182 
Temporal immediacy .629 .123 
Regret .063 .686 
0.583 
Sorry .159 .787 
Guilt .183 .801 
Shame .268 .700 
Panel B: Positive Intent 
 
Perceived Intensity of 
Emotional Distress 
Moral Affect AVE 
Magnitude of consequences .745 .287 
0.651 Probability of consequences .878 .327 
Temporal immediacy .704 .327 
Regret .253 .730 
0.736 
Sorry .315 .790 
Guilt .375 .799 
Shame .359 .849 
 
Reliability 
The Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability of the items in the perceived intensity of emotional 
distress construct are 0.748 and 0.756, respectively for the negative intent act (Table 2, Panel A), and 
0.844 and 0.850, respectively for the positive intent act (Table 2, Panel B), suggesting acceptable 
reliability. 
The Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability of the items in the moral affect construct are 0.845 
and 0.847, respectively for the negative intent act (Table 2, Panel A), and 0.917 and 0.919, 
respectively for the positive intent act (Table 2, Panel B), indicating acceptable reliability. 
Table 2. Reliability and Inter-Construct Correlations 
Panel A: Negative Intent 
 Cronbach’s Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability  
Inter-Construct Correlations 
Intensity Affect 
Perceived Intensity of 
Emotional Distress 
0.748 0.756 0.707*  
Moral Affect  0.845 0.847 0.427 0.764* 
Panel B: Positive Intent 
 Cronbach’s Alpha  
Composite 
Reliability  
Inter-Construct Correlations 
Intensity Affect 
Perceived Intensity of 
Emotional Distress 
0.844 0.850 0.807*  
Moral Affect  0.917 0.919 0.694 0.858* 
*Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) 
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Validity 
We also test the convergent and discriminant validity of the perceived intensity of emotional distress 
and moral affect constructs. Adequate convergent validity indicates that the constructs should account 
for at least 0.5 of the average variance extracted (AVE) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
For discriminant validity, the AVE of a construct should be greater than the squared value of its 
correlation with another latent construct (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). The AVE of the 
perceived intensity of emotional distress construct are 0.500 and 0.651 for the negative and positive 
intent acts, respectively; hence, the requirements of convergent validity are fulfilled. The squared root 
values of the AVE are greater than the correlation between the perceived intensity of emotional 
distress and moral affect for the negative and positive intent acts (Table 2), suggesting acceptable 
discriminant validity. 
 
The AVE of the moral affect construct are 0.583 and 0.736 for the negative and positive intent acts, 
respectively, indicating convergent validity. Further, the square root values of AVEs are greater than 
the correlation between the perceived intensity of emotional distress and moral affect constructs 
(Table 2), suggesting acceptable discriminant validity. 
 
Test of Mediating Effect 
We employ the approach of Muthen and Asparouhov (2015) in the mediation analysis. Using the 
regression analysis in Mplus, the mediating test results show that moral affect mediates the effect of 
perceived intensity of emotional distress on responsibility judgment (β3 = 0.201, p = 0.003, Table 3, 
Panel A) for the negative intent act, supporting Hypothesis 1a. 
The mediating test results do not indicate that moral affect mediates the relationship between 
perceived intensity of emotional distress and responsibility judgment (β = 0.008, p = 0.898) for the 
positive intent act. Thus, Hypothesis 1b is not supported. 
 
Test of Moderating Effect 
We conduct the moderating test using the regression analysis in Mplus. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Brown, 2006; Byrne, 2011) are used to 
assess the model fit. AIC and BIC are comparative fit measures where the model with a smaller value 
has a better fit. We examine two models where the first model comprises only the main effect of the 
moderating variable on the dependent variable (i.e., responsibility judgment), and the second model 
consists of both the main effect and the interaction between moral affect (mediator) and consideration 
of the outcome (moderator) on responsibility judgment. 
Table 3. Results of Hypotheses 
Panel A: Test of Mediation 
 
IV MV DV 
1) IV→MV 2) MV→DV 3) IV+MV→DV 
Mediation 
β 
p-
value 
β 
p-
value 
β p-value 
H1a Intensity Affect Resp 0.365 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.201 0.003 Supported 
H1b Intensity Affect Resp 0.820 0.000 0.010 0.897 0.008 0.898 
Not 
Supported 
  
                                                     
3 All the coefficients are unstandardized. 
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Panel B: Test of Moderation 
 IV DV 
IV→DV 
Moderation 
β p-value 
H2a IntAff Respon 0.167 0.007 Supported 
H2b IntAff Respon 0.182 0.001 Supported 
 
IV=Independent Variable, MV=Mediating Variable, DV=Dependent Variable 
Intensity=Perceived Intensity of Emotional Distress, Affect=Moral Affect, Resp=Responsibility Judgment  
IntAff = The interaction between Perceived Intensity of Emotional Distress and Moral Affect  
 
For the negative intent act, the AIC and BIC values of the model without the interaction term are 
5271.706 and 5368.178, respectively. When the interaction term is included, the AIC and BIC values 
decrease to 5266.626 and 5366.210, respectively, indicating that the model with the interaction term 
has a better fit. The results indicate that consideration of the outcome strengthens the effect of moral 
affect on responsibility judgment (β = 0.167, p = 0.007, Table 3, Panel B) for the negative intent act, 
supporting Hypothesis 2a. 
For the positive intent act, the AIC and BIC values of the model without the interaction term are 
5353.213 and 5449.685, respectively. These values decrease to 5340.354 and 5439.937, respectively, 
after the interaction term is introduced, suggesting improved model fit. The results reveal that 
consideration of the outcome strengthens the effect of moral affect on responsibility judgment (β = 
0.182, p = 0.001, Table 3, Panel B) for the positive intent act; therefore, Hypothesis 2b is supported. 
Discussion 
The results show that moral affect explains the effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on 
responsibility judgment for the negative intent act. When the victims are perceived to experience 
emotional distress as a result of the negative intent act, individuals might believe that the perpetrator 
should regret and be sorry, guilty, and ashamed of the act, leading to judgment of increased 
responsibility to restore equity for the victims. This finding is consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994; de Hooge et al., 2011; Haidt, 2008; Ketelaar and Au, 
2003) suggesting that moral affect is elicited when morality is violated. 
However, for the positive intent act, moral affect does not explain the effect of perceived intensity of 
emotional distress on responsibility judgment. Considering the nature of positive intent, individuals 
may perceive the act as less disastrous due to lack of intention to cause emotional distress to the 
victims. Individuals might conclude that the victims’ emotional distress is a result of a side effect 
from the positive intent act, and that the ultimate outcome of improving information security might 
not be achieved without the act. Therefore, the positive intent act may be perceived as less morally 
wrong and the perpetrator may be perceived as less responsible for the act. This contention is 
consistent with prior research findings (e.g., Cushman, 2014; Masek, 2000).  
The results also indicate that consideration of the outcome positively strengthens the effect of moral 
affect on responsibility judgment for both the negative and positive intent acts. This suggests that 
consideration of the outcome increases the belief that the perpetrator should regret and be sorry, 
guilty, and ashamed of the act (i.e., moral affect). Consideration of the outcome reminds individuals 
of the sufferings of the victims (Singer and Lamm, 2009), leading to the belief that the act is morally 
unacceptable regardless of whether the intent is negative or positive. 
This study highlights the significance of the nature of intent and consideration of the outcome in 
individuals’ evaluation of moral issues (i.e., information security breach). Since the findings suggest 
that individuals might condone a positive intent act, organizations should be cognizant of potential 
perpetrators who engage in information security breaches with a negative intent but claim that they do 
not have any intention to cause harmful consequences. Perpetrators may claim that they engage in an 
information security breach with a positive intent (Chiesa, Ducci, and Ciappi, 2009) and use this as an 
excuse to continue to engage in the activity.  
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When perpetrators hack a corporate system with an intent to improve system security, organizations 
can emphasize the harmful consequences to discourage the act. Since these perpetrators do not have 
any intention to cause emotional distress to the victims, they may not even realize that the act would 
cause emotional distress to the victims (Thomas, 2002). Perpetrators engaging in an information 
security breach with a positive intent usually send messages to organizations prior to the intrusion to 
inform them of the information security weaknesses. They also offer suggestions on security 
enhancement and are unlikely to attack the systems again if the entities have taken appropriate actions 
to improve their systems (Chiesa et al., 2009). However, some organizations do not take these 
messages seriously; hence, the perpetrators may attack the systems again to compel these 
organizations to improve their systems (Nicholson and Dash, 2011). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
This study has some limitations. First, consideration of the outcome and responsibility judgment are 
assessed separately via only one item. Future research can develop comprehensive scales to measure 
these constructs to provide additional insight into the findings. Further, since the findings are based on 
a survey of the participants, future research can design an experiment to promote understanding of the 
issues examined in this study. An experimental study can shed light on the insignificant mediating 
effect of moral affect on the relationship between perceived intensity of emotional distress and 
responsibility judgment for the positive intent act reported in this study. 
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